Country: Argentina

Years: 1945

Head of government: Edelmiro Julián Farrell

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies Farrell’s party affiliation as none. DPI does not identify ideology. Zanatta and Aguas (2005) identify Farrell’s ideology as rightist, “[en] el l 4 de junio de 1943, los militares tomaron el poder en Buenos Aires, estableciendo un régimen que, aunque con conspicuas peculiaridades, podía ser inscripto en la familia de los fascismos” [“On June 4, 1943, the military took power in Buenos Aires, establishing a regime that, although with conspicuous peculiarities, could be inscribed in the family of fascism.”] Duggan and Lewis (2019: 309) write, “Following the military coup of 1943, he became minister of war and was appointed vice president in October of that year. He became president in February 1944 after overthrowing General Pedro Pablo Ramírez in a palace coup.” The authors also identify Juan Perón as the person in charge of economic policy, writing, “[Perón] also took the lead in economic policy, promoting industrial development and the establishment of military-related industries, and creating the Banco de Crédito Industrial and the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce.” Herrera (2007) writes, “Mobilizing the working class produced a tension with the military and conservative factions that would plague both Peronism and the nation’s politics for the remainder of the 20th century. Despite the mobilization of the poor by Perón and his wife, Eva, the former colonel’s inspiration was the fascist model that seemed to be prospering in Italy. At the time, fascism had many attractions: the promise of industrialization, nationalist protection of the economy and a militarized state capable of maintaining social order. While Perón admired Mussolini, he favored the Latin American variant: Mexican populist and PRI founder Lázaro Cárdenas. Perón understood that he needed support from the masses. Ultimately, the populist component of Peronism prevailed over its fascist inclinations; Peronism was decisively a working class party that ushered in the rise of mass politics in Argentina.”

Years: 1946-1954

Head of government: Juan Domingo Perón Sosa

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as leftist. CHISOLS identifies Perón’s party as Partido Laborista (PL). Political Handbook of the World (2015) adds that “Juan Domingo Perón Sosa was elected chief executive in 1946, inaugurating a populist dictatorship that was eventually overthrown in 1955… Perón’s influence over the political arena can hardly be exaggerated, as it was during his government and through his leadership that unions were recognized as legitimate political actors and that the ‘masses’ (known as the *descamisados* or ‘shirtless ones’) were incorporated into political strategies.” Political Handbook also writes, “What was formerly the Justicialist Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Justicialista—MNJ) grew out of the extreme nationalist Peronist (also known as *laborista*) movement led by General Juan Perón from 1946 to 1955. Formally dissolved after its leader went into exile, the Peronists regrouped, in alliance with a number of smaller parties, as the Justicialist Liberation Front (*Frente Justicialista de Liberación*—Frejuli) before the 1973 election.” Perspective monde (2019) identifies party affiliation as PL from 1946 to 1951 and Partido Peronista from 1952 to 1955, identifying both as rightist. Lentz (1994: 36) writes, “[Perón] began his administration with pledges of social reform which, with the assistance of his wife, assured him loyalty of the peasant masses… His wife, known as Evita, was Perón’s link to the Argentine peasants.” World Statesmen (2019) identifies party affiliation as PL before 1947, which then became PJ after 1947. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 18 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of PJ as 6.3 and the average divided-united (0-10) score of PJ as 4.0. Herrera (2007) writes, “Mobilizing the working class produced a tension with the military and conservative factions that would plague both Peronism and the nation’s politics for the remainder of the 20th century. Despite the mobilization of the poor by Perón and his wife, Eva, the former colonel’s inspiration was the fascist model that seemed to be prospering in Italy. At the time, fascism had many attractions: the promise of industrialization, nationalist protection of the economy and a militarized state capable of maintaining social order. While Perón admired Mussolini, he favored the Latin American variant: Mexican populist and PRI founder Lázaro Cárdenas. Perón understood that he needed support from the masses. Ultimately, the populist component of Peronism prevailed over its fascist inclinations; Peronism was decisively a working class party that ushered in the rise of mass politics in Argentina.” Di Tella and Dubra (2018: 4) write, “This is consistent with our analysis of Perón’s speeches of the 1944-55 period, which appear to be on the left side of the political spectrum… Our results suggest that most Argentine voters are on the left of the political spectrum (relative to voters in the US), but that, surprisingly, within Argentina, Peronist beliefs tend to be more on the right of the political spectrum relative to those of the opposition. In relative terms, Peronist beliefs in the 1990s appear to be similar to Republican beliefs. In other words, the opposition to Perón seems to have come from the conservatives while the opposition to the Peronists in the 1990s seems to have come from the ideological left.” The authors (8) then write, “In brief, it seems clear that Perón’s arrival on the political scene in the 1940s coincided with the increased importance of labor in Argentina’s economy, and a reduced importance of openness to foreign capital and trade as the global economy was affected by the war and the Great Depression. Accordingly, Perón’s ideology reflected a degree of nationalism and faith in government intervention that would persist over time. The Peronist opposition, however, seems to have evolved from a traditional conservative position to a position that is on the left of the political spectrum.” McFlynn (1983) writes, “As is fairly well known, the avowed intention of Peronist ideology was to find a ‘third position’ between capitalism and socialism… Only in economic affairs did the consequences of the third position seem reasonably clear. Here Perón distinguished between an economy *directed* by the State and one *led* by it. Private property and private enterprise were not abolished but capital came under government control, with the Central Bank ‘leading’ monetary circulation, credit and investment; foreign trade was led by the state monopsony IAPI (Instituto Argentino para la Promoción del Intercambio); public services by the state; and production by the five-year plan.” In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.893) in 1973. Funke et al. (2020) identify Perón as a “left-wing populist” (77).

Years: 1955-1957

Head of government: Pedro Eugenio Aramburu Cilveti

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Aramburu’s party affiliation as none. Lentz (1994: 37) describes Aramburu as anti-Peronist: “On November 13, 1955, Aramburu and other members of the junta charged Lonardi with appeasing Peronists and forced him from office.”

Years: 1958-1961

Head of government: Arturo Frondizi Ercoli

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as centrist. CHISOLS identifies Frondizi’s party as Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (UCRI). Political Handbook of the World (2015) adds that “The UCR, whose history dates from the late 19[th] century, represents the moderate Left in Argentine politics. In the period following the deposition of Juan Perón, the party split into two factions, the People’s Radical Party (Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo—UCRP) and the Instransigent Radical Party (Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente—UCRI), led by former presidents Arturo Illia and Arturo Frondizi, respectively.” Though Perspective monde (2019) identifies it as center-left, Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) identify both Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and UCRI as centrist. World Statesmen (2019) corroborates party affiliation as UCRI and identifies the party as social-democratic. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify UCRI’s ideology as “Center” (-0.174) in 1973.

Years: 1962

Head of government: José María Guido

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as centrist. CHISOLS does not identify party. World Statesmen (2019) identifies Guido’s party as Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente (UCRI) and identifies the party as social-democratic. Though Perspective monde (2019) identifies the party as center-left, Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) identify both Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) and UCRI as centrist. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify UCRI’s ideology as “Center” (-0.174) in 1973.

Years: 1963-1965

Head of government: Arturo Umberto Illia Francesconi

Ideology: centrist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as centrist. CHISOLS identifies Illia’s party as Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo (UCRP). Political Handbook of the World (2015) adds that “The UCR, whose history dates from the late 19th century, represents the moderate Left in Argentine politics. In the period following the deposition of Juan Perón, the party split into two factions, the People’s Radical Party (Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo—UCRP) and the Instransigent Radical Party (Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente—UCRI), led by former presidents Arturo Illia and Arturo Frondizi, respectively.” Perspective monde (2019) corroborates party affiliation as UCRP and identifies the party as centrist. Lentz (1994: 39) adds that “A coalition in the electoral college with the Conservative, Democratic Socialist, and Christian Democratic parties gave [Illía] a majority, and he was sworn into office on October 12, 1963.” World Statesmen (2019) corroborates party affiliation as UCRP and identifies the party as radical and progressive.

Years: 1966-1969

Head of government: Juan Carlos Onganía Carballo

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Onganía’s party affiliation as none. Manzano (2017) codes Onganía as right. Lentz (1994: 39) highlights his beliefs, writing, “Onganía believed in the separation of powers and opposed military dictatorships… Onganía became disillusioned with the civilian presidency [of Illía] and feared a resurgence of Perónism in the country.” As president, “He tried to lead a government balanced with civilian and military members, but came into conflict with the Argentine labor unions after a series of strikes in 1967… Onganía attempted to establish a government of ‘Participacionismo’ in which labor, industry, agriculture, and other special interest groups would form committees to advise the government.” Rulers.org explains, after Onganía was installed as head of government, “all political parties were made illegal.”

Years: 1970

Head of government: Roberto Marcelo Levingston Laborda

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Levingston’s party affiliation as none. Manzano (2017) codes Levingston as right.

Years: 1971-1972

Head of government: Alejandro Agustín Lanusse Gelly

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Lanusse’s party affiliation as none. Manzano (2017) codes Lanusse as right. However, Rulers.org writes, “He reestablished diplomatic ties with China and met with Chile’s Marxist Pres. Salvador Allende in July 1971. His liberal approach disturbed right-wing officers who mounted an armed challenge in October 1971.”

Years: 1973

Head of government: Juan Domingo Perón Sosa

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Perón’s party as Partido Justicialista (PJ). Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) do not identify PJ’s ideology. DPI codes “Peronist” as leftist from 1974 to 1975. Perspective monde (2019) corroborates party affiliation as PJ and identifies the party as leftist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 18 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of PJ as 6.3 and the average divided-united (0-10) score of PJ as 4.0. Di Tella and Dubra (2018: 4) write, “Our results suggest that most Argentine voters are on the left of the political spectrum (relative to voters in the US), but that, surprisingly, within Argentina, Peronist beliefs tend to be more on the right of the political spectrum relative to those of the opposition. In relative terms, Peronist beliefs in the 1990s appear to be similar to Republican beliefs. In other words, the opposition to Perón seems to have come from the conservatives while the opposition to the Peronists in the 1990s seems to have come from the ideological left.” Di Tella and Dubra (2018: 8) then write, “A somewhat different picture emerges from the period leading to the Peronist administration of the 1970s… As riots erupted in Córdoba, left wing terrorism became a political force with some legitimacy (given the lack of democracy) and a claim to membership in the Peronist ‘movement.’ There is some evidence that Perón himself encouraged this identification with the left… Eventually, in the 1970s, with the terrorist organizations still active after Perón’s return to the country’s presidency, he broke with them in a dramatic speech, ejecting them from the Plaza de Mayo. Thus, in contrast to the early years, when Peronism arrived and launched a true workers’ movement opposed to the Conservatives, during the 1970s at least part of the opposition to Perón seems to have come from the ideological left… In brief, it seems clear that Perón’s arrival on the political scene in the 1940s coincided with the increased importance of labor in Argentina’s economy, and a reduced importance of openness to foreign capital and trade as the global economy was affected by the war and the Great Depression. Accordingly, Perón’s ideology reflected a degree of nationalism and faith in government intervention that would persist over time. The Peronist opposition, however, seems to have evolved from a traditional conservative position to a position that is on the left of the political spectrum.” McFlynn (1983) writes, “As is fairly well known, the avowed intention of Peronist ideology was to find a ‘third position’ between capitalism and socialism… Only in economic affairs did the consequences of the third position seem reasonably clear. Here Perón distinguished between an economy *directed* by the State and one *led* by it. Private property and private enterprise were not abolished but capital came under government control, with the Central Bank ‘leading’ monetary circulation, credit and investment; foreign trade was led by the state monopsony IAPI (Instituto Argentino para la Promoción del Intercambio); public services by the state; and production by the five-year plan.” In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.893) in 1973. Funke et al. (2020) identify Perón as a “left-wing populist” (77).

Years: 1974-1975

Head of government: María Estela Martínez Cartas de Perón

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies Martínez de Perón’s party as Partido Justicialista (PJ). Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) do not identify PJ’s ideology. DPI identifies Martínez de Perón as “Peronist,” coded as leftist from 1974 to 1975. Political Handbook of the World does not provide any information on party’s ideology. Perspective monde (2019) corroborates party affiliation as PJ and identifies the party as leftist. However, Lentz (42: 1994) writes that Martínez de Perón “was nominated for vice president on August 4, 1973, but her choice was an unpopular one with the anti-Perónist and leftist elements in Argentina.” Later on in 1974, “She was sworn in as president and attempted to continue her husband’s policies.” Her personal secretary and social welfare minister José López Rega, “was also the alleged leader of the Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance, a terrorist group responsible for many death-squad-style killings of leftist critics of the government.” In the Global Party Survey 2019, 18 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of PJ as 6.3 and the average divided-united (0-10) score of PJ as 4.0. Di Tella and Dubra (2018: 4) write, “Our results suggest that most Argentine voters are on the left of the political spectrum (relative to voters in the US), but that, surprisingly, within Argentina, Peronist beliefs tend to be more on the right of the political spectrum relative to those of the opposition. In relative terms, Peronist beliefs in the 1990s appear to be similar to Republican beliefs. In other words, the opposition to Perón seems to have come from the conservatives while the opposition to the Peronists in the 1990s seems to have come from the ideological left.” Di Tella and Dubra (2018: 8) then write, “A somewhat different picture emerges from the period leading to the Peronist administration of the 1970s… As riots erupted in Córdoba, left wing terrorism became a political force with some legitimacy (given the lack of democracy) and a claim to membership in the Peronist ‘movement.’ There is some evidence that Perón himself encouraged this identification with the left… Eventually, in the 1970s, with the terrorist organizations still active after Perón’s return to the country’s presidency, he broke with them in a dramatic speech, ejecting them from the Plaza de Mayo. Thus, in contrast to the early years, when Peronism arrived and launched a true workers’ movement opposed to the Conservatives, during the 1970s at least part of the opposition to Perón seems to have come from the ideological left… In brief, it seems clear that Perón’s arrival on the political scene in the 1940s coincided with the increased importance of labor in Argentina’s economy, and a reduced importance of openness to foreign capital and trade as the global economy was affected by the war and the Great Depression. Accordingly, Perón’s ideology reflected a degree of nationalism and faith in government intervention that would persist over time. The Peronist opposition, however, seems to have evolved from a traditional conservative position to a position that is on the left of the political spectrum.” McFlynn (1983) writes, “As is fairly well known, the avowed intention of Peronist ideology was to find a ‘third position’ between capitalism and socialism… Only in economic affairs did the consequences of the third position seem reasonably clear. Here Perón distinguished between an economy *directed* by the State and one *led* by it. Private property and private enterprise were not abolished but capital came under government control, with the Central Bank ‘leading’ monetary circulation, credit and investment; foreign trade was led by the state monopsony IAPI (Instituto Argentino para la Promoción del Intercambio); public services by the state; and production by the five-year plan.” In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.893) in 1973. Funke et al. (2020) identify Martínez Cartas de Perón as a “left-wing populist” (79).

Years: 1976-1980

Head of government: Jorge Rafael Videla Redondo

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Videla’s party affiliation as none. Manzano (2017) codes Videla as right. Keesing’s Record of World Events (1985) states that Martínez de Perón was overthrown in 1976 in a military coup orchestrated by “a group of extreme right-wing air force officers”. Rulers.org writes that Videla “suspended Congress… political parties, and labour unions” after taking power. Rulers.org also writes, “Several thousand people—leftists and other opponents of the regime—disappeared during his rule, presumably killed, sometimes by being thrown into the ocean off ‘death flights.’”

Years: 1981

Head of government: Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri Castelli

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies ideology as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Galtieri’s party affiliation as none. Manzano (2017) codes Galtieri as right. Lentz (1944: 44) writes, “During the 1970s Galtieri was active in the army’s antiterrorist campaigns against leftist guerillas.”

Years: 1982

Head of government: Reynaldo Benito Antonio Bignone Ramayón

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Bignone’s party affiliation as none. Manzano (2017) codes Bignone as right.

Years: 1983-1988

Head of government: Raúl Ricardo Alfonsín Foulkes

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG identifies as centrist. CHISOLS identifies Alfonsín’s party as Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). Lentz (1994: 45) elaborates, writing, “Alfonsin broke with the president of the Radical party, Ricardo Balbin, in 1972 over the issue of conciliation with the military and Perónists, and he founded the Renovation and Change faction. Alfonsin was a severe critic of military rule, and when Balbin died in 1982, Alfonsin reunited the two factions. He was nominated by the Radical party for the free elections called for October 30, 1983.” Political Handbook of the World (2015) identifies the ideology of the UCR as leftist, stating, “The UCR, whose history dates from the late 19th century, represents the moderate Left in Argentine politics.” Perspective monde (2019) identifies the party as center-left. Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) identify Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) as centrist. World Statesmen (2019) corroborates party affiliation and identifies UCR as “centrist” and “social-democratic”. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify UCR’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.486) in 1983, “Center-left” (-0.615) in 1985, and “Center” (-0.379) in 1987. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify “negligible visible disagreement” in UCR in 1983 and 1985 and “some visible disagreement” in UCR in 1987. Ortiz de Zárate (2016) writes, as president, Alfonsín “[r]ealizó varios viajes a América Latina, Estados Unidos, Asia, la URSS y Europa Occidental, donde frecuentó a los dirigentes de la Internacional Socialista.” [He made several trips to Latin America, the United States, Asia, the USSR and Western Europe, where he frequented the leaders of the Socialist International.] Krauss (2009) writes, “[Alfonsín] studied law at the National University of La Plata, and while there became active in the centrist Radical Civic Union party, attracted by its populist programs… Developing a reputation as a maverick, he founded an insurgent faction within the Radical Civic Union. He and his supporters stressed social reforms and hoped that they could loosen the Peronists’ hold over the masses.” The Week (2009) states, “In the ensuing election, Alfonsín ‘just squeaked by with 52 percent of the vote. But it was a watershed as chastened militarists ceded power to a moderate politician.’”

Years: 1989-1998

Head of government: Carlos Saúl Menem Akil

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies as rightist. CHISOLS identifies Menem’s party as Partido Justicialista (PJ). DPI identifies PJ’s ideology as rightist from 1989 to 2002. Perspective monde (2019) corroborates party affiliation as PJ but identifies the party as leftist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 18 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of PJ as 6.3 and the average divided-united (0-10) score of PJ as 4.0. Duggan and Lewis (2019: 468) write, “Despite the populist stance during the campaign, which promised a productivity revolution involving a compromise between business and labor that echoed the rhetoric of the Tercera Posición of the first Peronist administration, such was the economic crisis confronting Menem that he was gradually persuaded to embrace the Washington Consensus. The model, then in the ascendant, emphasized trade liberalization, privatization, and market economics; these policies had been tentatively essayed during the latter part of the Alfonsín presidency but blocked by Peronist trade unions and scuppered by the PJ majority in Congress.” Duggan and Lewis (2019: 263) also write, “Reelected governor, Duhalde upped his criticism of Menem, maintaining that the latter’s neoliberal program was un-Peronist and socially destructive.” Herrera (2007) writes, “Carlos Menem, the first post-dictatorship Peronist president, began his term in 1989 with many promises to the working class. However, he soon came to represent an entirely new type of Peronist: an economic conservative who undertook sweeping market reforms and allied with the right.” Di Tella and Dubra (2018) write, “Of course, the 1990s was a period where both the US and Argentina are ruled by two politicians, Menem and Clinton, that are elected on a platform that is on the left of the political spectrum but who end up implementing reforms that are more consistent with centrist/conservative values.” Levitsky and Murillo (2003: 157) write, “The three Peronist candidates appealed to poorer and less educated voters outside the urban centers. Their platforms also diverged considerably. Menem campaigned on the right, championing the free-market and pro-U.S. policies of the 1990s and promising to crack down on crime and social protest.” Corradi (1992: 81) writes, “During Menem’s presidential campaign, he vowed to do all that Alfonsín did not; though he kept them vague, his promises were clearly based on the traditional Peronist ideas of welfare and redistribution. Once in office, however, Menem changed course dramatically: he won with populist promises but governed with the recipes of right-wing marketeers. The about-face was not without precedent in Argentina or abroad. In 1959, despite campaign promises to the contrary, President Arturo Frondizi had allowed foreign companies to invest in Argentina. In the early 1980s, French President François Mitterand and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González Márquez proved that reversals from populist statism to market liberalism happen in the first world too. And in most instances the shifts were beneficial.” Snyder (1994: 103) writes, “Although elected as a candidate of the Perónist Justicialist Party, Menem quickly proved that he would not be bound by ideological trappings as he set out to dismantle the Perónist lock on the economy. He shocked die-hard Perónists when he included several prominent free market capitalists in his cabinet and formed a political alliance with the center-right UCeDe minority party.” Treisman (2003) writes, “To the astonishment of most of his supporters, Menem appointed a cabinet of well-known businessmen and liberal politicians and announced a program of orthodox reforms to open up the economy and reduce government intervention.” Pesce (2018: 39-40) writes, “Carlos Menem’s run to the political scene of Argentina was particularly characterized by the affection and empathy he demonstrated to the population. For citizens, Menem meant a return to the beloved populism, something that had certainly worried the financiers… Mr. Menem’s political campaign was distinguished by a combination of the traditional Peronist rhetorics, but also by a profound respect for democratic institutions.” Smith (1991: 52) writes, “Menem’s willingness to jettison Peronist dogma and populist promises for a *salariazo*, made during the election campaign, became apparent when he announced the members of his first cabinet. By naming Miguel Roig to the key post of Minister of Economy, Menem demonstrated his commitment to policies which would be congenial to the business community… Another significant choice was his appointment of Jorge Triaca, the head of the plastic workers’ union, as Minister of Labor, signaling a strong tilt to the Right in favor of the conservative, anti-reform sectors of the Peronist labor movement.” Manin et al. (1999) write, “How did presidential candidates in Latin America make inferences about voters’ preferences? In part from public opinion polls…. Candidates also drew on their knowledge of the preferences of major voting blocks. In Argentina, Carlos Menem’s strategists believed important voting blocks were vigorously opposed to the liberalization that the Menem team was planning; they dissembled in order not to lose the support of their constituents. The best source is Menem himself, who in a 1993 magazine interview explained why the decision to pursue austerity and large-scale privatizations, taken well before the election, was not revealed to the public until later: ‘The three golden rules of behavior are to be perfectly informed, keep that information secret and act with surprise. That’s what I did all my life. If in the election campaign I tell people ‘we are going to renew relations with England,’ I lose 20% of the vote. If I tell the people ‘I’m going to privatize telephones, railroads, and Aerolíneas [the national airline],’ I have against me the whole labor movement’ (cited in Nunn 1994).” In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center-left” (-0.688) in 1989, “Center-right” (0.804) in 1991, “Center-right” (1.293) in 1993, “Center-right” (1.174) in 1995, and “Center-right” (1.176) in 1997. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify “ a high level of visible disagreement” in PJ in 1989, 1991, and 1993 and “some visible disagreement” in PJ in 1995 and 1997. Funke et al. (2020) identify Menem as a “right-wing populist” (80).

Years: 1999-2000

Head of government: Fernando de la Rúa Bruno

Ideology: centrist

Description: World Statesmen (2019) and Rulers (2019) identify Adolfo Rodríguez Saá Páez Montero instead of Fernando de la Rúa Bruno as head of government on December 31, 2001. HoG identifies ideology as centrist. CHISOLS identifies de la Rua’s party as Unión Cívica Radical (UCR). However, Political Handbook of the World (2015) identifies the ideology of the UCR as leftist, stating, “The UCR, whose history dates from the late 19th century, represents the moderate Left in Argentine politics.” Although Perspective monde (2019) identifies de la Rua’s party as Alianza para el Trabajo, la Justicia y la Educación (Alianza), it identifies both Alianza and UCR as center-left. World Statesmen (2019) identifies party affiliation as UCR and AL (Alianza), coding UCR as centrist and describing AL as a “center-left coalition of UCR & Frente Solidario.” Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) identify Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) as centrist. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify UCR’s ideology as “Center” (0.264) in 1999.

Year: 2001

Head of government: Adolfo Rodríguez Saá Páez Montero

Ideology: leftist

Description: World Statesmen (2019) and Rulers (2019) identify Adolfo Rodríguez Saá Páez Montero instead of Fernando de la Rúa Bruno as head of government on December 31, 2001. HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies head of government and party affiliation as Partido Justicialista (PJ). DPI identifies PJ’s ideology as rightist from 1989 to 2002. Political Handbook of the World does not provide any information on party’s ideology. Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) do not identify PJ’s ideology. Perspective monde (2019) corroborates party affiliation as PJ but identifies the party as leftist. Political Handbook of the World (2015) states that in 2005, “former presidents Menem and Rodríguez Saá campaigned as leaders of a distinctly minor Justicialist Loyalty and Dignity (*Lealtad y Dignidad Justicialista*—LDJ) faction” of PJ. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 18 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of PJ as 6.3 and the average divided-united (0-10) score of PJ as 4.0. Levitsky and Murillo (2003: 157) write, “The three Peronist candidates appealed to poorer and less educated voters outside the urban centers. Their platforms also diverged considerably. Menem campaigned on the right, championing the free-market and pro-U.S. policies of the 1990s and promising to crack down on crime and social protest. By contrast, Rodríguez Saá and Kirchner campaigned against the free-market policies of the 1990s. Whereas Rodríguez Saá cast himself as a traditional Peronist, with a nationalist and populist appeal, Kirchner positioned himself as a modern progressive, adopting a center-left ‘neo-Keynesian’ platform.” In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.539) in 2001. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify “a high level of visible disagreement” in PJ in 2001.

Years: 2002

Head of government: Eduardo Alberto Duhalde Maldonado

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. CHISOLS identifies Duhalde’s party as Partido Justicialista (PJ). DPI identifies PJ’s ideology as rightist from 1989 to 2002. Political Handbook of the World (2015) does identify Duhalde as rightist, stating, “some more conservative PJ dissidents, including the Duhalde family.” Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) do not identify PJ’s ideology. Perspective monde (2019) corroborates party affiliation as PJ but identifies the party as leftist. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 18 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of PJ as 6.3 and the average divided-united (0-10) score of PJ as 4.0. Duggan and Lewis (2019: 263) write, “Reelected governor, Duhalde upped his criticism of Menem, maintaining that the latter’s neoliberal program was un-Peronist and socially destructive.” Levitsky and Murillo (2003: 156) write, “Desperate for a candidate to defeat Menem, Duhalde turned to Néstor Kirchner, a little-known governor who had been one of the few Peronists to oppose Menem throughout the 1990s.” Gaudin (2016) writes, “Duhalde and Menem were, and continue to be, irreconcilable antagonists who fiercely vie for the leadership of the party. So Duhalde’s support for Kirchner was basically a marriage of convenience. Indeed, they have never had a trusting political relationship, and have locked horns within the PJ over key issues—the privatization of state enterprises, for example.” Sullivan (2002: 5) writes, “In contrast to Argentina’s economic policy of opening and liberalization in the 1990s, Duhalde has promised such populist measures as increasing the state’s role in the economy and protecting local industries.” Sullivan (2002: 6) also writes, “If President Duhalde turns his populist rhetoric into concrete protectionist actions, there could be an effect on the momentum toward hemispheric free-trade and negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)… The open, free-market model of economic development in the region could be jeopardized if Argentina moves towards erecting protectionist trade barriers.” Levitsky (2000) writes, “The PJ, torn between Menem’s neoliberalism and Duhalde’s more populist profile, was unable to present a coherent message… Although Duhalde managed to retain the bulk of the traditional Peronist electorate, he failed to attract most of the independent and conservative voters who had backed Menem in 1995.” In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center-right” (0.539) in 2001. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify “a high level of visible disagreement” in PJ in 2001.

Years: 2003-2006

Head of government: Néstor Carlos Kirchner Ostoic

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG identifies as leftist. CHISOLS identifies Kirchner’s party as Partido Justicialista (PJ). Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) do not identify PJ’s ideology. Political Handbook of the World (2015) describes Kirchner as a “progressive Peronist.” Although Perspective monde (2019) identifies Kirchner’s party as Frente para la Victoria (FPV), it identifies FPV as center-left and PJ as leftist. Herrera (2007) writes, “Today, [PJ] again holds the presidency under Néstor Kirchner who represents a center-left Peronist coalition.” Levitsky and Murillo (2003: 157) write, “The three Peronist candidates appealed to poorer and less educated voters outside the urban centers. Their platforms also diverged considerably. Menem campaigned on the right, championing the free-market and pro-U.S. policies of the 1990s and promising to crack down on crime and social protest. By contrast, Rodríguez Saá and Kirchner campaigned against the free-market policies of the 1990s. Whereas Rodríguez Saá cast himself as a traditional Peronist, with a nationalist and populist appeal, Kirchner positioned himself as a modern progressive, adopting a center-left ‘neo-Keynesian’ platform.” In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center” (-0.405) in 2003. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify “a high level of visible disagreement” in PJ in 2003. Funke et al. (2020) identify Kirchner as a “left-wing populist” (82).

Years: 2007-2014

Head of government: Cristina Fernández de Kirchner

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG identifies as leftist. CHISOLS identifies Fernández de Kirchner’s party as Partido Justicialista (PJ). Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) do not identify PJ’s ideology. Although Perspective monde (2019) identifies Fernández de Kirchner’s party as the center-left Frente para la Victoria (FPV) in the first part of her term, it identifies her affiliation from 2011-2015 as FPV/PJ and identifies the coalition as center-left. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center” (-0.405) in 2003. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify “a high level of visible disagreement” in PJ in 2003. Funke et al. (2020) identify Fernández de Kirchner as a “left-wing populist” (83).

Years: 2015-2018

Head of government: Mauricio Macri

Ideology: rightist

Description: HoG identifies as rightist. Lansford (2015) identifies Macri’s party as Propuesta Republicana (PRO) (2015: 66). DPI identifies PRO’s ideology as rightist. Political Handbook of the World (2015) elaborates, writing, “Businessman Mauricio Macri launched the center-right Buenos Aires-based PRO before the 2005 election.” However, Perspective monde (2019) identifies Macri’s party as Cambiemos and identifies the party as centrist. World Statesmen (2019) corroborates party affiliation as PRO and identifies the party as center-right. Huber and Stephens (2016: 8) identify PRO as rightist. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PRO’s ideology as “Center-right” (1.429) in 2015 and “Center-right” (1.427) in 2017.

Years: 2019-2020

Head of government: Alberto Fernandez

Ideology: leftist

Description: HoG does not identify ideology. Perspective Monde (2020) identifies Fernandez’s party as Frente Común and identifies the party as center-left. World Statesmen (2020) identifies Fernandez’s party as PJ. Encyclopedia Britannica (2020) identifies Fernandez’s party affiliation as Front of All (Frente de Todos), writing, “Fernández stepped into the spotlight in 2019 as the presidential candidate of the Front of All (Frente de Todos) coalition on a slate that included former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-15) as its candidate for vice president.” Encyclopedia Britannica also writes, “For most of his political career, however, he was a member of the Peronist Justicialist Party.” DPI identifies PJ as leftist in 2015 and 2016 and Frente de Todos as leftist in 2019. Perspective monde (2019) identifies PJ as rightist from 1989 to 2002 and as leftist since 2003. In the Global Party Survey 2019, 18 experts identify the average left-right (0-10) score of PJ as 6.3 and the average divided-united (0-10) score of PJ as 4.0. Do Rosario and Gillespie (2020) write, “Argentina’s ruling coalition, Frente de Todos, is seeking to impose a one-time tax on wealthy citizens as part of a strategy to solidify the alliance’s left-wing credentials while boosting government revenue amid a deteriorating economic crisis.” Jourdan and Misculin (2019) write, “Argentina’s Peronists swept back into power on Sunday, ousting conservative president Mauricio Macri in an election result that shifts Latin America’s No. 3 economy firmly back toward the left after it was battered by economic crisis.” BBC News (2019) reports, “For most of his political life [Fernández] has been a member of the Justicialist Party (PJ), which follows the principles of the populist former president Juan Perón and is now part of the main centre-left opposition coalition, Frente de Todos.” Nugent (2019) describes Fernández as “a little-known former adviser from the moderate wing of [Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s] Peronist Justicialist party,” and writes, “Like the Kirchners, Fernández belongs to the Justicialist Party, the formal home of the ideologically complex Peronist movement.” In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify PJ’s ideology as “Center” (-0.405) in 2003. In V-Party (2020), 11 experts identify “a high level of disagreement” in PJ in 2003.

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